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The Time the U.S. Navy Almost Assassinated the President
LMAO - Unbelievable - so funny how this kinda stuff never gets talked about - Frazod was on this ship?
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Wow fdr was lucky.
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I don't know what the worse story is - this one, or the time the Air Force almost nuked North Carolina!
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Something similar also happened off the coast of Georgia. Tybee Island, or something like that. And that bomb might have had the big bang-bang installed. |
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Palomares_B-52_crash |
This is a bit off topic, but I've always found it interesting during the Cold War that nuclear war was avoided by a single man on a Russian submarine.
Literally moments from changing the entire course of history. |
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But here's a link about it. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasi...ssile%20Crisis. On 27 October 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a group of 11 United States Navy destroyers and the aircraft carrier USS Randolph located the diesel-powered, nuclear-armed Foxtrot-class submarine B-59 near Cuba. (The B-59 was one of four Foxtrot submarines sent by the USSR to the area around Cuba.) Despite being in international waters, the United States Navy started dropping signaling depth charges, which were intended to force the submarine to come to the surface for identification.[4][5] By then, there had been no contact from Moscow for a number of days, and although the B-59's crew had been picking up U.S. civilian radio broadcasts earlier on, the submarine was too deep to monitor any radio traffic, as it was busy trying to hide from its American pursuers. Those on board did not know whether war had broken out or not.[6][7] The captain of the submarine, Valentin Grigoryevich Savitsky, decided that a war might already have started and wanted to launch a T-5 nuclear torpedo.[8] Unlike other Soviet submarines armed with the "special weapon", where only the captain and the political officer were required to authorize a nuclear launch, three officers on board the B-59 were required to authorize the launch because Arkhipov was also the chief of staff of the brigade (not the commander as is often incorrectly reported, who was in fact Captain First Rank Agafonov Vasili Naumovich).[9][10] The three men were Captain Savitsky, Political Officer Ivan Semyonovich Maslennikov, and Executive Officer Arkhipov. An argument broke out among the three of them, with only Arkhipov against the launch.[11] Although Arkhipov was only second-in-command of the B-59, he was also the chief of staff of the flotilla. According to author Edward Wilson, the reputation Arkhipov had gained from his courageous conduct in the previous year's K-19 incident played a large role in the debate to launch the torpedo.[8] Arkhipov eventually persuaded Savitsky to surface and await orders from Moscow. His persuasion effectively averted a nuclear war that likely would have ensued if the nuclear weapon had been fired.[12] The batteries of the B-59 ran very low and its air conditioning failed, which caused extreme heat and generated high levels of carbon dioxide inside the submarine.[13] It surfaced amid the U.S. warships pursuing it and made contact with a U.S. destroyer. After discussions with the ship, B-59 was then ordered by the Russian fleet to set course back to the Soviet Union.[14] |
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This is my favorite though. NORAD had something similar happen in the 1970s. I'll see if I can find it: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kionasm...h=1bcc1b622835 If things had gone just slightly differently on a tense night in 1983, today would be the 35th anniversary of the start of of World War III, for whoever was left alive to observe such an occasion. 6:00 Eastern Time on September 25, 2018 marks the moment when one man's decision saved the world from nuclear war. At just after midnight in Moscow, on September 26, 1983, a siren's wail split the air in the Serpukhov-5 nuclear early-warning facility, a secret bunker just south of Moscow. The red screen across the room from Lt. Colonel Stanislav Petrov's glass-walled office, usually blank, flashed a single ominous word: START. The computer system responsible for processing data from the Soviet Union's Oko launch-detection satellites warned that the United States had just launched a single intercontinental ballistic missile at the Soviet Union. It would strike in 12 minutes. Petrov picked up the phone in one shaking hand and called his superiors in the Soviet Air Defense Forces. False alarm, he told them. It didn't make sense for the U.S. to have launched a single missile; the reading had to be a bug in the new early warning computer system, which Petrov the software engineer didn't yet completely trust. He had just set the phone back on its cradle when the system flashed a second warning, then three more. Five nuclear missiles were, according to the satellites and their computer system, flying on high ballistic arcs toward the Soviet Union. The computer system calculated the probability of attack at 100%. PROMOTED "I had a funny feeling in my gut," Petrov later told a reporter from the Washington Post. If the launch was real, every second would count. Petrov's duty was to pass the warning up the chain of command, providing information to the people with the authority to launch a return salvo before the U.S. missiles could destroy the Soviet Union's ability to strike back. But he hesitated. He knew the computer system had been pushed into service too quickly for proper testing, and he didn't consider it reliable. Ground radar, which should have picked up the incoming missiles as soon as they crossed the horizon, remained silent and empty a few minutes after the supposed launch. And five missiles, out of the roughly 1,000 in the U.S. inventory, all aimed at Soviet targets, seemed like too few to be a real first strike -- when war came, Soviet officers had been taught, the first strike would be massive an overwhelming, because neither power was likely to get the chance to make a second. With the siren still wailing and the alert still flashing on the screen, Petrov picked up the phone and called his superiors to report a second false alarm. But even in that moment, he wasn't sure. |
Here we go:
https://futurism.com/a-computer-glit...rt-world-war-3 The US early warning system is on watch 24/7, looking for signs of a nuclear missile launched at the United States. As a highly complex system with links to sensors around the globe and in space, it relies heavily on computers to do its job. So, what happens if there is a glitch in the computers? Between November 1979 and June 1980, those computers led to several false warnings of all-out nuclear attack by the Soviet Union—and a heart-stopping middle-of-the-night telephone call. I described one of these glitches previously. That one, in 1979, was actually caused by human and systems errors: A technician put a training tape in a computer that then—inexplicably—routed the information to the main US warning centers. The Pentagon’s investigator stated that they were never able to replicate the failure mode to figure out what happened. Just months later, one of the millions of computer chips in the early warning system went haywire, leading to incidents on May 28, June 3, and June 6, 1980. The June 3 “Attack” By far the most serious of the computer chip problems occurred on early June 3, when the main US warning centers all received notification of a large incoming nuclear strike. The president’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezezinski woke at 3 am to a phone call telling him a large nuclear attack on the United States was underway, and he should prepare to call the president. He later said he had not woken up his wife, assuming they would all be dead in 30 minutes. Like the November 1979 glitch, this one led NORAD to convene a high-level “Threat Assessment Conference,” which includes the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is just below the level that involves the president. Taking this step sets lots of things in motion to increase survivability of U.S. strategic forces and command and control systems. Air Force bomber crews at bases around the US got in their planes and started the engines, ready for take-off. Missile launch offices were notified to standby for launch orders. The Pacific Command’s Airborne Command Post took off from Hawaii. The National Emergency Airborne Command Post at Andrews Air Force Base taxied into position for a rapid takeoff. The warning centers, by comparing warning signals they were getting from several different sources, were able to determine within a few minutes they were seeing a false alarm—likely due to a computer glitch. The specific cause wasn’t identified until much later. At that point, a Pentagon document matter-of-factly stated that a 46-cent computer chip “simply wore out.” |
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I'd never heard that one before. Fascinating. |
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I wouldn't trust history to DC. Three pages in before tinfoil hats dominate
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Ignore is better.
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meth in the lube tube
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LMAO |
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https://resources.flexera.com/web/re...2/58005893.jpg |
nuclear bomb would ruin my chances to go back to back in fantasy football
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<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/f9Gb4PakFTU?si=Z_r-GujAGrbYgQWQ" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen></iframe> Also, bite me. nlm |
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Blown up by a plane, that was underwater, that it had already shot down. Hell of a legacy, Willy D.
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Does these guys come to mind! |
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youre a master baiter |
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